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Abstract 
The local authority Act 171 of 1976 intended uniformity in operations among local authorities, however, certain 
provisions were observed as hindrance to attainment of its objective thus the basis of the study. The study was 
conducted on a qualitative approach using purposive sampling technique with valuation officers to local 
authorities as respondents for interview. Documents were sought and acquired from local authorities, analyzed 
and used as triangulation to interview. Data was transcribed before categorization, sub-themes were found and 
refined before the final themes were formulated. Findings revealed non uniformity in operation within local 
authorities especially on areas of percentage rate charges and classification of properties/uses based on which 
rates percentages were applied thus diversity within intended uniformity. 
Keywords:    Rating, taxation, fairness, vertical, horizontal 
 
1  Introduction 
 Attainment of sustainable development practices is dependent on our ability to effectively manage the 
environment as individual and as a country either by direct or indirect participation (Stockholm 1972). The 
rationale behind the levy of  landed property tax known as property rates is not too far from the philosophy of 
sustainable development, because the proceeds from property rating are used to carry out such services as waste 
management, public health control, provision and maintenance of recreational parks/gardens, city landscaping 
and disease minimization/control among others. Discharge of such responsibilities by local authorities will 
affords present generation advantage of enjoying environmental comfort and convenience without negatively 
affecting the interest of future generation.  These responsibilities are synonymous to all local authority councils 
whose greater proportion of income comes from property rates (Pawi, et al 2011). Property rates are deduced 
from a process called property rating. 
 Property rating is a process of determining annual/rateable values of property/hereditament using an acceptable 
method from the recognized methods of valuation to analyzing some key data on the subject property to arrive at 
how much the property could reasonably be exchanged for  between a willing tenant and an owner in an arm 
length transaction as at the date of assessment by a valuation officer or his appointed agent (Hefferan 2007) and 
(Wyam et al 2011).  
Article 6 of the British Local Government Act of 1988 defined rateable value of non domestic hereditament to be 
an equal amount estimated as rent that a hereditament might reasonably be expected to let from year to year 
assuming that the tenancy commences on the day the estimate was made, that the hereditament is in 
good/reasonable state of repair and that the tenant is responsible for the payments of all rates, taxes, insurance, 
and repairs necessary to keep the property in good state of repair to command the rent(Lichfield & Connellan, 
1997). 
 The application of any of the various methods as most suitable method of valuation on any particular property in 
order to determine the annual value of such property/hereditament is solidified in the case of Garton vs Hunter 
(1969) where it was emphasized that an assessment surveyor or valuation officer may use more than one method 
to arrive at the annual value of a property taking into account nature of property and market characteristics, thus 
in appropriate for a surveyor to use  direct rental evidence of comparable property on a subject property that have 
no similarities in use, structures, location and legal status as decided in  Imperial College of Science and 
Technology vs Ebdon (VO) and Westminster City Council [1984] LT RA 213 (Sayce & Connellan, 2003).  
 Property rating in Malaysia is constitutionally authorized by section 74 (2-4) of Malaysian constitution as 
revised up to 2006 empowering all states without prejudice to any power to make laws conferred on it by any 
other article, the legislature of any state may make  laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the ninth 
schedule or concurrent list. Section 2 (e)  provided for transfer of land , mortgages , leases , and charges in 
respect of land and easements. Therefore property rates are regarded as a source of revenue to the local 
authorities for the discharge of their official responsibilities (Plimmer, et al 2010).  
Property rating assessment is built on certain basic principles which are; (a) The hereditament/property must be 
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assumed vacant and ready to let at the best price possible in an arm length transaction (b) The property must be 
valued based on its physical condition rebus sic stantibus (c) Rent passing on the property may only be 
considered if it is adjudge as market rent (d) Comparable assessment may be considered in the absence of a 
better evidence  (e) A ratable unit is considered usually to include the whole of the land and whole of the 
building in the occupation of an occupier with a single cartilage. (f) That the property is subjected to its highest 
and best use (Olusegun, 2002).  
The Act provided for valuation of hereditament in order to generate revenue for  discharging statutory 
obligations resting on local authorities subject to approval from the state authority. They include but not limited  
to sanitary and solid waste management services, provision and Maintenance of neighborhood children play 
ground, public health and social welfare. Property revaluation should be done after every 5 years as provided in 
section 137 (3). This provision is similar to most other countries except for some countries who revalue 
properties on a three year basis as is the case in some states of the USA. Compliance to the provision for 
revaluation of properties after every five years has been a challenge in Malaysia due to in adequate trained 
manpower (Kelly & Musunu, 2000 & Jenkins 1992) and political pressure on the government (othman, 1986). 
The situation provoked a research focused on the Development of e- rating valuation system on commercial and 
industrial properties in Malaysia with inclination on the principle of rebus sic stantibus  (Nawawi, 2008), the 
research concluded with a regression analysis tested at 10% ahead or below actual valuation analysis for 
commercial and industrial property valuation in Malaysia. 
 
 2 Aim of the Study 
Consequent upon the creation of local authorities council in  peninsular Malaysia,  the local authority Act 171 of  
1976 was enacted for the purpose of ensuring uniformity of law, policy and operations  with respect to local 
authorities in peninsular Malaysia. Section 130 (1-3) of the Act provided for levy of rates on annual value at a 
percentage rate not exceeding 35% of assessed annual value or a levy on improvement value not exceeding 5% 
of assessed improvement value. This research seeks to explore how uniformity is achieved among the local 
authorities with such varying bases and percentage charges with reference to principles of fairness and equity in 
taxation.   
 
3 Literature review 
Property rating is a form of compulsory levy on annual income generated in actual or implied from land and 
landed property adjudge rateable and captured in the rating valuation list of the local authority. It is usually a 
source of revenue to local authorities in most countries including Malaysia, proceeds from rates are utilized in  
providing public services. Several literature suggest certain principles or requirements of a taxation system. 
Although land and landed property taxation differs with other forms of taxation, yet most of the principal 
requirements are equally applicable to property rating system; (Palil, 2010) such principles are considered below 
3.1 Principle of fairness based on benefits enjoyed from the authority 
 Fairness in a tax system as presumed by most people to be achievable through a tax structure by way of 
differentiating tax burdens according to economy among tax subject. Achieving fairness in tax system is some 
worth complex and difficult on progressive and a flat rate tax burden as is illustrated by (Francis & Foster2008). 
A progressive system is considered more fair than a flat rate system especially on middle class people who are 
most affected by tax burden where they are made to pay higher than the rich who earn more. conversely the rich 
would pay higher as they earn higher if the rate were to be progressive as against flat rate. This situation is 
similar to flat rate percentage on properties subjected to the same kind of use regardless of amenities, occupancy 
ratio for a given space as is the case with low density residential neighbourhood and high density 
neighbourhood. This can be explained in situations where you find the same area of land say measuring 2000m
2
 
accommodating over one hundred families in a high rise building pattern is also used to accommodate one 
family mansion in a low density residential neighbourhood subjected to the same rate of tax liability which 
ultimately produce lower income than in the case of high density due to multiple occupation. This made the rich 
to have surplus savings/net income than those in middle class who lives in high density neighbourhood . 
According to (Berniaz, 2009) a tax system is only fair when it does not charge the poor, charges low on the 
medium income earners and leaving the greater tax burden with the high income earners on the notion that the 
higher income earners have a lot surplus that need to be brought to the centre for common benefit of all. These 
controversies as what constitute a fair tax system left a lot of illusions in the mind of tax payers especially within 
low income earners thus the rationale behind adoption of a common approach by Economist to assume a fair tax 
system as that built on vertical and horizontal equity. 
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3.2 Vertical Equity 
The philosophy behind vertical equity emphasized the need to consider well being of the tax payers in 
apportioning tax burden thus the need for graduation according to levels of economic status of the tax payers, 
this implies that individuals on higher level of economic status are presumed high income earners over 
individuals with low level of economic status thus the need for those on higher economic status to pay higher 
rates than those on the lower economic status. Although administrators finds difficulty in determining who earns 
higher than who but seems clearly easy in property rate charges as is it is based on either the annual or capital 
value of the property while the property is fixed, visible and can be assigned monetary values thus economic 
status can be determined by value of the property he or she owns or occupied as the case may be. Therefore, 
property value in this circumstance provides a good measure of ability to pay tax burden imposed on the owner 
or occupier of the property. Although (Slemrod, & Bakija, 2001) contended that higher income earned are only a 
measure of individuals productivity in a given economy and not ability to pay tax thus should be encouraged for 
being productive with low tax burden.  Others opined that individuals be taxed on the basis of consumptions 
which is hardly determinable and even where determined, there exist some contention as whether savings will be 
considered, because an individual who spend all of his income may likely be taxed higher than an individual who 
saves more while an individual who spent all of his income may not necessarily be the highest income earner 
(Stiglitz, 2000). Continued pursuit of most fair way of taxing individuals brought the issue of discounted life 
time income from all sources as against annual income to be the bases of taxation, this is again faulted on the 
basis that individuals could have the same life time but different pattern and volume of income over their 
lifetime period thus their discounted income will obviously differ and so their tax burden. From the foregone 
narration and analysis, it could be seen that none of those bases in the vertical equity have provided a solution to 
the problem of fairness in taxation (O,Roatry, et al 1997). 
3.3 Horizontal Equity 
The principle of horizontal equity in taxation is also geared towards fairness in taxation to ensure equal treatment 
among tax payers who are seen equal in most relevant aspects, it is therefore expected that individuals with the 
same taxable capacities be levied the same tax burden without preferences. Equal treatment to hundreds or 
millions of people is rather difficult to achieve as various people will ask the question how are two individuals 
identical in most aspects? is it of age, sex, marital status, expenditure, income? what does equal treatment mean 
to me and others? Income is a major factor of consideration in horizontal bases of taxation on the assumption 
that individual earning the same income pays the same tax but that is not always the case as there may be some 
discrimination as can be seen in the home mortgage interest deductions where owner occupiers are favoured 
while those on rented apartments are extorted in a way. Therefore income of individuals could be the same but 
tax burden may differ depending on the considerations of the tax system on such issues as reliefs and exemptions 
thus the difficulty to simply classify individuals as the same in most aspect notwithstanding their income status, 
hence application of equality in taxation may be difficult (Stiglitz, 2000).    
3.4  Principle of fairness based on ability to pay and benefit 
Constant attempt to define fair distribution of tax burden among the various classes of income earners within 
societies brought about the philosophy of fairness based on benefit derived and ability to pay tax liability by 
individuals. Ability to pay principle is sometimes difficult to ascertain especially where able people claim in 
ability except where the obvious is used as against individual declaration. While the principle of benefit driven 
by the tax payer is built on the premise that individual tax burden should be proportional to the benefit they 
receive from Government in terms of services, infrastructural facilities and business working conditions 
necessary to turn productive abilities into stream of income (Musgrave & Musgrave 1976). The benefit principle 
requires major beneficiaries of services to pay higher than those benefiting lesser in a systematically graduated 
manner based on the benefits driveable from the services and infrastructures provided by the Government. This 
principle is practically hard to apply except where the benefit driveable by the individual can be ascertained for 
quantification to determine who benefit most over others, such as the fees payable on bridges and road tolls 
where it is charged based on the distance covered on the specific lane in question. Other common examples are 
the water and sewage charges where it is based on the individual actual consumption or discharges using the 
appropriate measuring implements installed for monitoring. Despite this parameters, the benefit principle fails to 
guide how tax burden should be fairly distributed as it is difficult to determine exactly the benefit derived by 
individuals on certain services provided by the government to the public as members of the public enjoys certain 
important services provided by the government as Defence, fire service, police, public fumigations, aesthetic 
environments and most others whose extent of individual benefit are difficult to determine. Another identified 
set back of the principle of benefit is that, it limit government from using tax machinery in income redistribution 
among individual since everybody is compelled to pay only the benefits he enjoyed from services provided by 
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government, then of course there is apparently no room for exempting the poor from tax burden or subsidizing 
the services they enjoy and thus living the rich with surplus net income that would have been brought to the 
centre in order to subsidized for the poor and weak individuals as provided in the poor relief Act of 1601. The 
consequential effect of the scenario is on the poor and low income earners who constitute majority to live 
without basic social welfare services and necessities as defence, policing, education, health care and 
others(Umar,et al, 2012). 
Ability to pay principle refers to the quantum of tax burden that an individual could afford to pay regardless of 
the benefit he or she derived from services provided by  Government. Therefore  tax burden is dependent on 
level of sacrifice made by way of payment so that as the rich makes sacrifices also the poor makes relative to 
their ability as a low income earner could pay ten Ringgit Malaysia and see it a big sacrifice just as the rich sees 
payment of one thousand Ringgit Malaysia as a big sacrifice. Therefore, every member of the society should 
make sacrifice commensurate to his abilities (Stiglitz, 2000). The problem here is also how to measure level of 
sacrifice by individual tax payer as it is difficult to measure relationships between individual income and tax 
burden levied on them.        
 3.5 Principle of Neutrality 
Property tax like any productive tax system is not expected to distort the tax payers economic well being thus 
should not make the tax payer worse but a contributor to the central funding without jeopardizing tax payers 
interest, therefore the principle of neutrality seeks to avoid situation of distortion to tax payers economic 
wellbeing (Aluko, 2005). It is seen to maintain a balance between individual payment obligation and net income 
available for upkeep. 
3.6  Principle of Accountability 
Tax payers make part with their hard earned income not because they have surplus but because it is important for 
the well being and development of the country thus require a sound accounting system that will place them in a 
comfortable situation as to the way and manner such funds are handled. Administrators of tax must therefore be 
made accountable to the people on expenditure incurred based on fiscal policies for tax payers to assess benefits 
and utilization in order to retain public confidence and loyalty, tax payers are better convinced on visible 
beneficial services provided and accessible public expenditure record (Monkam, 2010). 
3.7 Principle of Economy 
A tax system is most efficient if it causes little or no interference in the perfect functioning of an economy thus 
not causing distortion in a competitive economy where resource allocation is adjudge efficient. Allocation of 
resources is considered pare-to-optimal if no arrangement of resources could make one person better off without 
making someone else worse off. Practically, payment of money to the government in form of tax by individual 
leaves him or her with lower purchasing power or savings and subsequently affecting his or her economic 
behaviour and sometimes independence in so many respect (Stiglitz, 2000). As a result, individual have to either 
increase their man hour productivity to be able to earn more and sustain their consumptions or are compelled to 
cut down consumption to meet up with the after tax income thus causing an income effect or 
consumption/substitution effect depending on tax payers behaviour. Where a commodity tax is imposed, the 
average cost of good or service changes thereby motivating or forcing consumers to change from one commodity 
or service to the other, this act of change from one commodity to another given a certain level of income 
influenced by taxation is termed as substitution effect. This substitution effect usually interferes with consumers 
choice and consequently leading to economic inefficiency(Municipality & West, 2009)(Aluko, 2011). 
Taxes affecting average price of goods or services and subsequently forcing consumers into substitution due to 
disposable income variation occasioned by tax liabilities are termed distortionary taxes. Distortionary effects are 
not just associated with commodity taxes but also income taxes as individual could decide to cut their tax 
liabilities by working less hours which on overall affects national productivity and GDP. Situation may arise 
where distortionary effect may be programmed by government to shape the economy towards a more desirable 
resource allocation pattern presumed better than the existing pattern. A typical example is the imposition of high 
taxes on certain commodities to discourage their consumption thus consumers of such commodities would have 
to pay heavy taxes which in the long run may force them reduce such consumption or substitute if not total 
abstinence. Effects of taxation does not only ends on individual tax payers but also affects companies where a 
product of a company is taxed higher than its substitute, thus making the average price of that commodity to be 
higher than the substitute which impliedly force a change in the consumption of individual in favour of its 
substitute which affects the companys' production since there is a drop in demand/income, shareholders also 
suffers loss of income, employees losing their jobs and government also loosing revenue accruing from 
production of the commodity if it were not stopped. 
Having established the negative severity of taxes on individuals consumption patterns, individuals do make some 
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efforts to reduce their tax burden by way of objections, seeking for relief or exemption or even sometimes tax 
avoidance or tax evasion depending on individuals. The consequences are loss of revenue and consequential 
distortion in taxation which in the long run affects government dealing in the provision and discharge of her 
primary responsibilities to public thus beginning of system failure. Therefore, distortionary taxes results in 
economic in efficiency and greater economic loss to the community and public at large (Lymer & Hancock, 
2002). 
Lump sum taxes are alternatives to distortionary taxes where lump sum taxes are fixed and taxpayers could do 
nothing to alter the taxes while it raises more revenue to the government and leaving the tax payer on the same 
level a distortionary tax would have left him without causing severe negative effect as in the case of distortionary 
tax, thus raising more revenue without consequential negative effect on the tax payers welfare. Therefore, it is 
more ideal for government to impose lump sum taxes on individuals to avoid the effects of distortionary taxes. 
Lump sum tax levies are practically difficult for government to achieve fairness especially where the government 
lack adequate information about individual tax subjects thus distortionary taxes are inevitable in such 
imperfectly observed situation of income and expenditure as a yard stick to levy taxes. There is the need to 
institute an efficient tax system but rather too hard and difficult to attain in our contemporary world situation. 
The tax system should also be seen not to encourage less work as economic growth is a key developmental 
element that is influenced by work done and should also not be seen as such that inhibit the productive growth of 
investment and savings (James & Nobes, 2000). Therefore, the most balanced situation is for a tax system to 
ensure fairness among payers especially on vertical and horizontal equity such that class boundaries could be 
used in determining tax liability between class boundaries and within class boundaries. It is achievable in 
property rates where class boundaries in term of values within uses, locations and neighbourhoods are 
introduced.   
 
4  Method of data collection 
Interview sessions were held with local authorities valuation officers cutting across Eight local authorities of city 
hall status throughout Peninsular Malaysia. The choice of valuation officers as respondents was based on a 
purposeful sampling technique been the scheduled officers for those services with an established long working 
experience in the field thus most knowledgeable and could provide a good insight on the subject of investigation. 
Their primary responsibility included among other things to identify rateable properties, assess rate liability of 
properties based on approved approach adopted by the local authority, despatch and collect rate charges as well 
as maintaining records on all matters relating to property rating within the rating area of the local authority. 
Choice of eight local authorities is influenced by the nature of local authority classification in peninsular 
Malaysia. These local authorities selected are classified as city hall status considered advanced.  Interview with 
the valuation officers was conducted between February 2012 to July 2012. Documents on previous rating 
exercises showing the different classification of properties as well as rate percentage applied on each of the 
classification among all the local authorities were acquired from the local authorities. The documents assisted in 
understanding the diversification/differences and similarities among local authorities despite the intended 
uniformity as enshrined in the legislation. Use of existing documents  were employed to serve as triangulation to 
the facts unfolded during interview sessions. Interviews were recorded and later transcribed before coding. This 
made categorization of data possible before formulating themes as tentative findings of the research. 
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5 Data presentation and Discussion 
Table showing classification and percentage rate charge among local authorities 
Key: AV= Annual Value, IV= Improvement Value, IP= Ipoh, SA= Shah Alam, MK= Melaka, JB= Johor Bahru, 
PG= Penang, AS= Alor Star, DBKL= Dewan Bandaraya Kuala-Lumpur, PJ= Petaling Jaya 
S/
N 
Classification IP(AV
) 
SA(AV
) 
MK(AV
) 
JB(IV
) 
PG(AV
) 
AS(AV
) 
DBKL(AV
) 
PJ(AV
) 
1 Residential 
(planned) 
10% 4%       
2 Residential 
(Kampung) 
8%  6% 0.01%     
 3 Residential 
(Traditional 
Village) 
5%      2%  
4 Industrial 10% 7.5% 13% 0.28%  10%   
5 Industrial(vacan
t land) 
 7% 6.3%      
6 Agric land 6% 2%  0.07% 1% -  5.5% 
7 Agric 
land(vacant) 
 1%       
8 Mining land 2%        
9 Residential   11.5% 0.13%    7.7% 
10 Commercial 7%  13% 0.26% 10.3% 14%   
11 Commercial 
(vacant land) 
 6.5%       
12 Residential 
(Malay reserve) 
   0.05%     
13 Residential 
(permanent) 
     10%   
14 Residential 
(semi 
permanent) 
     10%   
15 Residential 
(temporary) 
     7%   
16 Industrial (new 
area) 
     65   
17 Residential 
(strata tittles) 
    8.3%    
18 Residential 
(low-cost) 
 3.5% 11%  7%   7.7% 
19 Residential 
(condomunium) 
 5%   7.5%    
20 Special (hotel, 
filling stations) 
    13.5%    
21 Residential 
(within 36 
miles) 
      6%  
22 Commercial 
(within 36 
miles) 
      12%  
23 Vacant land for 
comm (within 
36 miles) 
      10%  
24 Vacant land for 
Residential 
(within 36 
 3.5%     7%  
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miles) 
25 Residential 
(outside 36 
miles) 
      6%  
26 Commercial 
(outside 36 
miles) 
      12%  
27 Vacant land for 
Res & com 
(0utside 36 
miles) 
      6%  
28 Buildings for all 
purpose in other 
areas and 
villages 
      3%  
29 Vacant land in 
village 
      2%  
30 Vacant land for 
development 
 3.5%      6.6% 
31 Conservation 
land 
  5%      
32 Govt cont.   12%      
33 Residential 
(Vacant land) 
  6.3%      
34 Others        8.8% 
35 All village        5.5% 
Source: Documents and Interview Extracts constructed by authors 
5.1 Uniformity in operations 
Article D in the preambles of the Act made the objective clear to be the attainment of uniformity in operations 
within the local authorities of Peninsula Malaysia. It can be seen from data presented above that the Act did 
actually achieved adoption and by extension acceptance throughout the study area. However, data presented 
have revealed divergence in classification and approaches to determining rates liability which is primarily in the 
Act thus difficult to achieve uniformity in approach as all the approaches are statutorily approved. Glaringly, the 
two approaches provided in the Act are not the same, this can be attested from the percentage charge adopted by 
the local authority using improvement or capital value approach where none of the classification under the local 
authority is charged as much 0.30% while others are charging percentage rate on whole numbers  
5.2 Classification of holding for rating purpose 
 Section 129 of the Act states that the local authority may divide its area into two or more parts and may in 
respect of such separate parts impose rates considered just and proper and may further impose differential rates 
in accordance with the usage. Logical interpretation of this section will mean that local authorities could make 
differential classification even within the same use as residential. That is to classify residential uses or properties 
into various categories perhaps based on location or value. If this is done, it will give room for vertical and 
horizontal fairness in the classification such that properties located for example in a low density neighbourhood 
are charged higher percentage rate than those in the high density neighbourhoods, or a classification that will 
differentiate low income housing from high income housing either by space coverage, design, structure, 
accommodation and value. So also with the case of commercial and industrial properties which could be 
classified as low, medium and heavy industrial or commercial property/neighbourhood as the case may be. 
However, this will also mean from the content that every local authority have such powers with approval from 
respective states to determine the percentage rate of the classifications/area differently from others thus likely to 
produce varying percentage rate across local authorities which does not portray uniformity. 
  Table above provide a long list of classifications obtainable within the local authorities, a tour undertaken 
during the period of interview with local authority valuation officers provided an insight to the researcher that 
most of those classification are localized to particular local authority while there are few of them found common 
within some local authorities. It is logically observed during the interview that certain classification are 
obtainable across all the local authorities yet not all of those local authorities have them as classification such as 
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the planned residential area. It will certainly amaze the reader if a town is classified as city to exclude such a 
classification as planned residential area when others are using the classification. An interrogative  perception 
was raised by the researcher during interview with those local authorities who do not have it as a classification 
whether their residential area were not planned. The response was that we are not responsible for making such 
classification but the government (politician) who are certainly temporal in occupation of those esteem offices 
made the classification without recourse to seeking advice from professional civil servant. In some others, the 
response was that it was a long standing classification that was never reviewed to reflect contemporary status. 
Whatever be the case, non existence of harmony between the classification is visible. 
 Other local authority have a classification as permanent residential property that is built of sand Crete block 
bonded in cement mortar signifying a permanency in their nature, a characteristic that is also found in all the 
local authorities but only used as a classification in one local authority. Other classifications were the temporary 
properties whose nature included the properties built of ply wood or wood planks, coated aluminium and pre-
fabricated iron sheets. These kind of properties are commonly found in all the local authorities within certain 
locations but were not captured as a classification in most of the local authorities except in one local authority. 
Towns classified on the city hall status in Peninsular Malaysia are characterized with existence of condominium 
kind of buildings where you have multiple titles on strata basis whether a commercial or residential property but 
to the contrary of this peculiar attribute that is common to all is the non existence of such classification in most 
local authorities except in some few. Further investigations into revealed that the classifications existed before 
most of those developments and we are yet to review but in the process.  
5.3 Rate Percentage charges 
Section 130(1) of the Act empowers local authority to impose rates assessed on annual value of a property from 
1% to a maximum of 35% while Section 130(3) provides for the imposition of property rates on such properties 
assessed on improved value at a maximum of 5% of the assessed value. Consequently, local authorities charge 
different rates on the same kind of property which obviously does not portray uniformity. In fact the only one 
state with two local authorities of city hall status have different percentage rate charge; they are Shah Alam and 
petaling jaya where for example Shah Alam charges residential in condominium like design 5% while petaling 
jaya charge 6% on the same type. Shah Alam  is regarded as one of the most industrialized local authority in 
Malaysia charges 7.5% on industrial properties while Petaling jaya charges 8.8%, Shah Alam charge residential 
low cost housing 3.5% while Petaling Jaya charge 8.8% and Shah Alam charge 6.5% on commercial properties 
while Petaling Jaya charge 8.8% . These local authorities are located next to each other, in fact hardly 
differentiated by a passerby except those familiar with the administrative  boundaries. These cities together with 
Majlis bandaraya Kuala Lumpur makes the capital city Kuala Lumpur. Further comparison could be closely 
made with Kuala Lumpur where dichotomised classification exist as those within 36 mile and outside 36 miles. 
Within 36 miles will be used for the purpose of comparison with Shah Alam and Petaling Jaya. Commercial 
properties are charged 12% when Shah Alam and Petaling Jaya charge 6.5% and 8.8% respectively, Majlis 
Bandaraya Kuala lumpur charge 6% for residential when Shah Alam is charging 4% & 3.5% as against Petaling 
Jaya who charges 8.8% & 6%. Another common classification between the three is vacant land for residential 
development where Majlis Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur charge 7%, Shah Alam is charging 3.5% and Petaling Jaya 
8.8%. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Act 171 of 1976 have clear policy objective of achieving uniformity in operation within peninsular Malaysia 
which is viewed as intention to achieve fairness within property rate payers as a taxation system. Analysis of its 
content revealed some provisions negating the attainment of set objective due to some leverages provided for the 
local authorities. These leverages do not only negate the attainment of uniformity in operations but also making 
the possibility of achieving vertical and horizontal fairness among rate payers difficult. Because every local 
authority have different classification with varying rate percentage charge despite similarities in city structure 
and service provision as classified by the Government. Therefore, achieving the desired uniformity requires 
certain amendments in the Act to make certain uniform provisions on areas of classification and percentage 
charge. This can be better achieved with major contribution from local authority valuation officers who are 
directly involved in the field operations to achieve harmony and uniformity.   
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